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ARTICLES
THE ROLE OF SENTENCING GUIDELINE
AMENDMENTS IN REDUCING UNWARRANTED
SENTENCING DISPARITY
WHLIAM W. WiiKINS, JR.*
JoHN R..STmER**
In United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993) the United
States Supreme Court unanimously ruled that an obstruction en-
hancement under the federal sentencing guidelines for a defendant's
perjurious trial testimony does not contravene the constitutional
privilege of an accused to testify in her own behalf, provided the
sentencing judge makes a proper, independent finding that the
defendant in fact committed perjury at trial. The Court's decision
reverses an earlier decision by the Fourth Circuit, United States v.
Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1991), in which that appellate
court had differed from other circuits regarding the constitutionality
of the guidelines' enhancement for trial perjury. Dunnigan provides
a classic illustration of the United States Supreme Court exercising
its authority to resolve intercircuit conflicts and restore uniformity
in the interpretation of applicable constitutional law. In contrast,
when an intercircuit conflict entirely concerns differences in the
interpretation of federal sentencing guidelines provisions, the Court
has indicated it will look first to the United States Sentencing
Commission to address such conflicts through the exercise of the
Commission's amendment authority. Braxton v. United States, 111
S. Ct. 1854 (1991). In this article, the Chairman and General Counsel
of the Commission describe how the Commission has exercised its
amendment responsibility to achieve greater consistency among courts
in sentencing under the guidelines.
I. INTRODUCTION
The transition from indeterminate sentencing to determinate, guideline-
based sentencing, which began in November 1987 under the landmark
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA),' was as dramatic a change for the federal
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and Chairman, United
States Sentencing Commission.
** General Counsel, United States Sentencing Commission. The views expressed herein
are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the United
States Sentencing Commission.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1838, 1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559
(1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988).
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court system as any it has faced in the last century. After an initial fourteen-
month period of uncertainty, the United States Supreme Court, in Mistretta
v. United States,2 laid to rest a series of constitutional challenges to the
United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) and the guidelines, thus
ensuring nationwide use of the new sentencing system.
Since that historic decision, federal courts have imposed guideline sen-
tences in approximately 128,000 cases.3 Moreover, the rate of guideline
versus preguideline sentencing increased by the end of fiscal year 1992 to
almost eighty-five percent of all federal criminal cases. 4 These numbers
indicate that the federal courts are rapidly making the transition from a
nonguideline to a guideline sentencing system.
Congress was motivated by several primary objectives in enacting sen-
tencing reform legislation, but none was more important than increasing
fairness and uniformity in sentencing.5 Preliminary research by the Sen-
tencing Commission, 6 generally confirmed by the General Accounting Of-
fice, 7 revealed that the guidelines reduced previously wide sentencing disparity
for similarly situated offenders convicted of bank robbery,8 heroin traffick-
ing, 9 cocaine trafficking, 10 and bank embezzlement." Additionally, tracking
information on defendants subject to the guidelines shows that sentences
within the applicable range are imposed in approximately seventy-eight
percent of all cases; another fifteen percent of offenders receive a downward
departure based on the government's motion recognizing substantial assis-
tance provided in the investigation or prosecution of other cases; and seven
percent are sentenced either above or below the guideline based on sundry,
atypical mitigating or aggravating circumstances not adequately considered
by the guidelines.12
The guidelines continue to evolve through the interaction among im-
position of sentence in individual cases, appellate court decisions, and the
2. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
3. As of February 22, 1993, there were 127,740 cases in the Commission's data base
of cases sentenced under the guidelines post-Mistretta, a number that grows by 3,000-3,500
cases monthly.
4. Pursuant to the Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2, 101 Stat. 1266,
the guidelines are applicable only to offenses occurring on or after November 1, 1987.
5. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B); S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-
56, 159-81 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3222-339, 3342-64.
6. See generally 2 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N., THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GuiDEUNEs:
A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINEs SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON
DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA
BARGAINING 279-99 (1991).
7. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SENTENCING GUIDELINES-CENTRAL QUESTIONS RE-
M UNANSWERED 11 (1992).
8. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, at 288.
9. Id. at 292.
10. Id. at 296.
11. Id. at 299. These four areas were selected by the Commission for disparity analysis
because they represent offenses frequently prosecuted in federal court.
12. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT (forthcoming 1993).
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Commission's yearly amendment process. As a permanent agency, the
Commission has authority to send amendments to the guidelines or policy
statements to Congress on or before each May first. After an 180-day
review period, the proposed amendments-if not rejected by passage of
legislation-take effect on a date specified by the Commission. 3
The information that fuels this evolutionary process is rich and diverse.
The Commission codes up to 262 pieces of information about each guideline
sentencing that occurs in federal court. The resulting, steadily expanding
data base is an invaluable source of information for the Commission as it
monitors guideline application and refines the Guidelines Manual.14 In
addition, each year the Commission convenes interdisciplinary staff working
groups to prepare detailed reports about priority issues it has previously
identified. These reports cover various topics such as violent crime, money
laundering, acceptance of responsibility, and sentencing of drug offenses.
Federal judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, and other
interested parties provide helpful input for the Commission's decision-
making process through the submission of letters, position papers, and
testimony at public hearings. Additionally, the Commission receives com-
ment and amendment suggestions from a number of organizations, including
the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Department of Justice,
the American Bar Association, and ad hoc standing committees of defense
attorneys and federal probation officers.
Two other important sources of information regularly considered by
the Commission in its amendment process are district court statements of
reasons for imposing sentence15 and appellate court decisions on constitu-
tional, statutory, and guideline application issues. While the Commission is
not a party to individual sentencing proceedings, it closely monitors court
decisions. As the evolving process of guideline application renders it nec-
essary, the Commission exercises its statutory responsibility to amend the
guidelines in response to court determinations of guideline issues.
This article explores a number of facets of the amendment process,
placing particular emphasis on the manner in which the Commission uses
appellate court opinions interpreting the guidelines16 to formulate amend-
13. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988).
14. U.S. SENTENCING COmm'N, GuIDELINEs MANUAL (1992) [hereinafter GumWENEs MAN-
UAL].
15. District court statements of reasons for sentence, required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c),
may be formal published opinions or informal oral statements from the bench during the
course of sentencing proceedings. The latter are sent to the Commission as transcripts of court
proceedings or, more commonly, are summarized by the court or probation officer on a form
jointly developed by the Commission, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and the
Judicial Conference's Criminal Law Committee.
16. The emphasis in this article on appellate court opinions is not to suggest that guideline
application decisions of district courts and magistrate judges are less important in the amend-
ment process developed by the Commission. To the contrary, under the authority of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 994(w) and 995(a), the Commission, as heretofore explained, regularly receives and assim-
ilates into a growing data base information relating to case-specific application of the guidelines
1993]
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ments with a view toward promoting a greater degree of sentencing unifor-
mity. The article first outlines the statutory and legislative history background
relating to the interaction over time between court guideline decisions and
the Commission's amendment process. A discussion of the United States
Supreme Court's view of the Commission's amendment role follows. Against
the backdrop of congressional and highest court pronouncements, the article
examines Commission implementation of its amendment authority, both
with respect to changes affecting guideline range determination and those
relating to sentencing outside the range (that is, departures).
II. ROLE OF GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS UNDER THE SENTENCING REFORM
ACT
A. The Statutory Mission and Congressional Expectations
As part of its SRA design, Congress established "an independent
commission in the judicial branch"' 7 to develop "sentencing policies and
practices for the Federal criminal justice system." 8 It assigned the Com-
mission the formidable task of developing, within eighteen months, an initial
set of sentencing guidelines and policy statements and the responsibility for
their subsequent revision. In fulfilling this latter assignment, the Commission
was to be continuously engaged with other institutional components of the
criminal justice system, interested groups and individuals, and Congress
itself in a process of "constant refinement of sentencing policies and
practices as more is learned about the effectiveness of different ap-
proaches."' 19 Congress expected that the federal courts would be important,
regular contributors to the continuing development of sentencing policy as
they applied, interpreted, and added case law relating to the guidelines.
While the Commission would not have any direct adjudicatory role "second-
guessing individual judicial sentencing actions either at the trial or appellate
level," '20 it would be expected to monitor and evaluate court guideline
decisions carefully. Indeed, the SRA called for the Commission continuously
to examine "the overall operation of the guidelines system to determine
whether the guidelines are being effectively implemented and to revise them
if for some reason they fail to achieve their purposes." '2' In short, Congress
foresaw the necessity for periodic amendment of the guidelines, envisioning
and lower court sentencing decisions. It actively uses that information in the amendment
process. In particular, the Commission assesses lower court decisions for their likely cumulative
impact on sentencing policy over time and for the valuable insights such decisions provide
regarding judges' views of whether the guidelines appropriately take into account offense and
offender characteristics of actual cases.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1988).
19. S. RaP. No. 225, supra note 5, at 161, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3334.
20. Id. at 178, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3361.
21. Id.
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a dynamic, progressive sentencing policy centered around guideline appli-
cation experience.
B. Frequency of Amendments as a Policy Issue
As the SRA approaches the point in its history when members of the
Sentencing Commission are slated to become part-time, 22 a recurrent topic
of policy debate is the relative frequency with which further changes in the
Guidelines Manual should be made, in response to both court decisions and
other factors. Perhaps reality has furnished considerations different from,
and more weighty than, those Congress anticipated. 23 Nonetheless, the
congressional view of guideline amendment frequency, as evidenced by
relevant statutory provisions and accompanying history, must be considered
because of its particular relevance to this article's focus on Commission-
court interaction through the amendment process. Pertinent statutory pro-
visions and legislative history suggest that to the extent Congress had
expectations about the relative frequency of amendments, it envisioned an
active, vigorous amendment process, especially in the early years of guideline
implementation. One structural indication in the statutory scheme supporting
this view is the provision permitting multiple submissions of guideline
amendments to Congress" each year, albeit within the limited time frame
following the opening of a session of Congress and ending May 1 of each
year.Y The SRA's limitation on submission of guideline amendments to the
roughly four-month period at the beginning of each year, and the required
180-day walt prior to the amendments taking effect, appear to have been
designed more for the congressional purpose of maintaining oversight of
evolving Commission sentencing policies than as a check on the frequency
of amendments.
Another structural indication of Congress' expectation that the guide-
lines would be subject to frequent change in their early implementation is
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 992(c) (1988) (providing that voting members of Commission, except
Chairman, shall hold part-time positions beginning November 1, 1993 (six years after initial
implementation of guidelines)).
23. One eventuality not anticipated by Congress was that courts would interpret the ex
post facto clause of the Constitution as constraining use of the most current set of sentencing
guidelines, as Congress intended under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) and (5). The courts of appeals
have held uniformly that the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing may not be used if
they punish more severely than those in effect at the time of the defendant's offense. See,
e.g., United States v. Young, 932 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d
521 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Morrow, 925 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Nagi, 947 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2309 (1992); United States v.
Sweeten, 933 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1450 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 225 (1991); United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298 (D.C.
Cir. 1991); United States v. Harotunan, 920 F.2d 1040 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Suarez,
911 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Swanger, 919 F.2d 94 (8th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam); United States v. Worthy, 915 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). This departure from
congressional intent has created numerous guideline application difficulties that no doubt
account for much of the concern over the frequency of guideline amendments.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988).
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that, contemporaneous with the initial implementation of the guidelines,
Congress provided enhanced temporary amendment authority to the Com-
mission. 25 Under this authority, the Commission could issue temporary
amendments on an emergency basis in response to possible court invalidation
of a guideline, a criminal offense statutory change, and any other reason
regarding guideline application that the Commission determined to be "ur-
gent and compelling." '26 Furthermore, pursuant to this delegation of au-
thority, the Commission was empowered to amend the guidelines without
the necessity of any "report and wait" procedure, although amendments
issued under this "emergency guidelines promulgation authority," to be
retained, of necessity thereafter had to be submitted to Congress in the
course of a normal amendments cycle. 27
Congress' purpose in conferring on the Commission this temporary,
emergency amendment authority was to aid the initial process of guideline
implementation when it was expected that the Commission might need to
react quickly to guideline application problems and clarify Commission
intent.28 Regarding the provision that gave the Commission power to initiate
amendments for urgent and compelling reasons, Representative Hamilton
Fish, Republican floor manager for the bill in the House, stated, "[tihis
latter catchall authority is meant to facilitate the operation of the first set
of guidelines which nearly everyone recognizes will need quick technical and
in some cases substantive amendments in order to succeed.
' 29
Additionally, it should be noted that the expected need for continuing
refinement of the guidelines and policy statements in response to court
decisions and other developments was seen by the framers of the SRA as
a principal justification for making the positions of Commissioners full-
time for the first six years of guideline implementation. 0 In fact, Congress
anticipated that "revision and refinement of the guidelines will represent
the bulk of the Commission's work once the initial guidelines and policy
statements are promulgated."'" Thus, while the SRA also provided for a
25. Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 21, 101 Stat. 1266, 1271.
26. Id.
27. Id. The open-ended authority for the Commission to initiate temporary amendments
for any reason it deemed urgent and compelling expired May 1, 1988. Id. Additionally, the
authority to amend guidelines in response to court invalidation decisions and statutory changes
expired November 1, 1989. Id. The Commission subsequently converted all temporary, emer-
gency amendments into permanent provisions by promulgating them through the regular
amendment process.
28. 133 CONG. REc. H10021 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1987) (statement of Rep. Fish).
29. Id. The Commission ultimately used its emergency amendment authority to issue 54
temporary amendments effective on January 15, 1988; eight temporary amendments effective
on June 15, 1988; and three temporary amendments effective November 1, 1989. Thereafter,
because the Commission believed the regular, annual amendment authority would be adequate
to accomplish the SRA's desired guideline updating goals, it did not ask Congress to extend
the emergency amendment authority beyond its November 1, 1989, expiration.
30. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 5, at 160, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3343.
31. Id. at 178, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3361.
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number of important continuing research and education duties, in one
fashion or another most of these responsibilities related to the fundamental
congressional goal of achieving and perfecting a workable, effective guide-
lines system.
C. Basic Goals to Be Furthered by Amendments
Broadly speaking, the SRA envisions active use of the Commission's
guideline amendment authority to further two basic goals, one idealistic and
long term, the other more pragmatic and immediate. The longer term,
ambitious hope was that sentencing policies prescribed by the Commission
would evolve to "reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowl-
edge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process."'3 2 The
more immediate, pragmatic task-and one clearly of high priority-was that
of reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity. Although court experience in
applying and construing the guidelines is valuable in developing appropriate
guideline amendments-that further both goals, it is especially relevant with
respect to the latter disparity-reduction goal. In its discussion of the SRA
requirement that the Commission continually revise the guidelines, the Senate
Judiciary Committee Report explained:
Perhaps most importantly, this provision mandates that the Com-
mission constantly keep track of the implementation of the guide-
lines in order to determine whether sentencing disparity is effectively
being dealt with. In a very substantial way, this subsection comple-
ments the appellate review section by providing effective oversight
as to how well the guidelines are working.33
Therefore, putting aside for another day a discussion of the interactive
Commission-court relationship as it relates to the longer term SRA goals,
the balance of this article will focus on the relevance of the Commission's
amendment authority in reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity.
1. Avoidance of Unwarranted Disparity-A Continuous Objective of the
Courts and the Commission
The SRA places the avoidance of unwarranted disparity at the forefront
of its directives to both the courts and the Commission. Among the factors
courts must consider in the imposition of sentence is "the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct." 34 While the statute expressly
directs that courts "shall" consider this objective in their sentencing deci-
sions, the accompanying directives to sentence within the applicable guideline
range or depart from the range based on reasons stated on the record,
3
32. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (1988).
33. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 5, at 178, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3361.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)-(c) (1988).
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together with the provision for appellate review, 36 are the SRA's principal
means of assuring that court sentencing decisions will further disparity
reduction goals. Furthermore, in keeping with the SRA's call for a pro-
gressive, evolving system of sentencing guidelines and policy statements, the
Sentencing Commission was expected to glean important information from
district court reasons for sentence 37 and appellate court opinions38 that could
assist in the continuing process of amending and improving the guideline
system. Concerns for reasonable sentence uniformity, then, underlie both
the day-to-day court application of the guidelines and their further devel-
opment through the amendment process, based on the growing body of
experience.
Review of the Commission's statutory charter 9 similarly reveals that
"avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct" 4° is a principal
purpose of the Commission. The Commission is specifically directed, in
crafting the guidelines and policy statements, to give "particular attention"
to providing certainty, fairness, and reasonable uniformity in sentencing of
similar offenders who commit similar crimes.41 At the same time, the SRA
and its legislative history describe another central goal, punishment propor-
tionality and appropriate individualization of sentence, 42 that operates in
constant tension with the objective of disparity avoidance. By prescribing a
detailed guideline system that takes into account the most important and
commonly occurring offense and offender characteristics, and by permitting
courts to sentence outside the guidelines in cases with significant atypical
features, the SRA seeks to reconcile competing goals of proportionality and
uniformity.
2. Effect of Disparate Court Application-Enlarging the Guideline
Range Beyond Congressional Intent
Critical to both proportionality and uniformity goals is the SRA's
directive that the Commission construct guidelines that provide a sentencing
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
37. The statement of reasons required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) was designed to further a
number of purposes, including that of "assist[ing] the Sentencing Commission in its continuous
reexamination of its guidelines and policy statements." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 5, at 80,
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3263.
38. The process of appellate review of sentences was designed both to ensure the
appropriate application of the law and guidelines in the particular case and to aid the
development of sentencing policy. Among the policy objectives of the appellate review provi-
sions was that of "assist[ing] the Sentencing Commission in refining the sentencing guidelines
as the need arises." S. Rap. No. 225, supra note 5, at 151, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3334.
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 994(0.
42. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(A) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
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range "for each category of offense involving each category of defendant, 43
and that the width of the guidelines' imprisonment ranges not exceed "the
greater of 25 percent or 6 months.""4 The Commission implemented these
directives by making all imprisonment ranges as broad as statutorily per-
mitted. This design decision maximizes within-guideline sentencing discretion
in furtherance of the goal of individualized sentences. It also makes it
unnecessary that guidelines include every conceivably significant offense and
offender characteristic.
Yet, a guidelines system that uses a moderate number of important
offense and offender characteristics to prescribe an applicable guideline
range as broad as the statute will permit cannot successfully achieve the
congressional goal of reasonable sentence uniformity unless the guidelines
themselves are read and applied in a reasonably consistent manner. The
foundation upon which the system was constructed was that defendants of
similar characteristics who commit the same offense in a similar manner
would be sentenced within the same guideline range, regardless of whether
the defendants appeared before different sentencing judges in the same
district or in districts geographically distant. This goal may not be met,
however, when courts fail to apply guideline provisions consistently to like
offenders convicted of like offenses. When measured against the SRA
objective of guideline application uniformity for similar cases, one effect
of differences in court interpretations of guideline provisions may be to
enlarge the effective guideline imprisonment range applicable to defendants
having like offense and offender characteristics significantly beyond the
twenty-five percent or six-month maximum differential Congress intended.
Consider, for example, the disparity resulting from a guideline interpretation
by the courts in one judicial circuit that bank tellers routinely are to be
considered vulnerable victims4 in bank robbery offenses, thereby resulting
in a two-level enhancement of the defendant's sentence. In contrast, consider
that the courts in another circuit do not routinely characterize bank tellers
as vulnerable victims. The net effect of such an intercircuit inconsistency is
to enlarge the "within-guideline" potential difference in imprisonment sen-
tences between defendants sentenced in one circuit, and similar defendants
sentenced in the other circuit, from twenty-five to approximately fifty
percent."
43. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2).
45. See U.S.S.G. § 3Al.I (Vulnerable Victim). In United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097,
1100 (l1th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 275 (1990), the court of appeals upheld a district
court's finding that a bank teller was a vulnerable victim within the meaning of § 3A.1.
Subsequently, the Commission amended the application notes accompanying the guideline to
state Commission intent that a bank teller was not to be considered an unusually vulnerable
victim solely by virtue of performing a teller's job in a bank. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend.
454. Thereaffer, Jones was overruled. See United States v. Morrill, No. 91-8386 (l1th Cir.
Feb. 16, 1993) (en banc).
46. Suppose, for example, a bank robbery defendant without the § 3Al vulnerable
19931
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Differences in court construction of guideline provisions therefore can
lead to significant sentencing disparity. Anticipating that such application
disparities would occur, the SRA requires the Sentencing Commission to
monitor court sentencing decisions carefully for such significant variations
in guideline application. And, given Congress' strongly stated view that the
Commission use its amendment authority to further a reasonably uniform
body of sentencing guideline law, the SRA confers upon the Commission
the responsibility to employ that authority judiciously when necessary to
effectuate Commission intent and fundamental SRA goals 'more clearly.
III. TIE SUppREME COURT'S MESSAGE IN Braxton: REINFORCING THE
COMMISSION'S AMENDMENT RESPONSIBILITIES; COMMISSION IMPLEMENTATION
OF THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES
The United States Supreme Court strongly affirmed the Sentencing
Commission's role in resolving, through the guideline amendment process,
intercircuit conflicts in the interpretation of guideline provisions. In Braxton
v. United States,47 Justice Scalia's opinion for a unanimous court observed
that, under the SRA, the Commission has the initial and primary task of
addressing intercircuit conflicts in guideline interpretation. The Court cited
two principal reasons, evident from the SRA itself, for its conclusion. First,
it noted that "in charging the Commission 'periodically [to] review and
revise' the Guidelines, Congress necessarily contemplated that the Commis-
sion would periodically review the work of the courts, and would make
whatever clarifying revisions to the Guidelines conflicting judicial decisions
might suggest."' ' Secondly, the Court cited 49 the provisions of the SRA
that empower the Commission to make defendant-beneficial amendments
retrospectively available to defendants who are still serving terms of im-
prisonment, subject to the discretion of the sentencing court.50 Thus, as the
Court saw it, the SRA provides for a primary Commission role in promoting
a uniform regime of sentencing law and an auxiliary, remedial role with
respect to particular defendants who may have been sentenced more severely
than intended by the Commission.
One might speculate, of course, that the Court's decision in Braxton,
leaving to the Sentencing Commission the primary task of resolving inter-
victim enhancement is determined to have an offense level of 24 and criminal history category
of I, which results in a guideline range of 51-63 months. If the vulnerable victim enhancement
applies, the same defendant would have an offense level of 26 and guideline range of 63-78
months. The difference in length of imprisonment sentence between two defendants sentenced
at the bottom and top, respectively, of the lower range is 12 months or 23.5%. However, the
difference between two defendants, one of whom is sentenced at the bottom of the lower
range and the other at the top of the higher range, is 27 months or 52.9%. Thus, disparate
application of the vulnerable victim enhancement across circuits to otherwise similar cases can
result in more than a doubling of the maximum imprisonment sentencing differential intended
by the SRA.
47. 111 S. Ct. 1854 (1991).
48. Id. at 1857-58.
49. Id. at 1858.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 994(u) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (1988).
SENTENCING GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS
circuit conflicts in guideline language, is simply another manifestation of a
general philosophy of judicial restraint, or that the decision was motivated
by concerns of an increased caseload involving appeals of lower court
guideline applications. More likely, Braxton represents a fundamentally
pragmatic view that the Commission, as the source of the sentencing law
embodied in the guidelines, ultimately is in the best position to know how
it intended that law to be interpreted and applied, and to take amendment
action to implement its intent. In any event, by interpreting the SRA as
intending that the Commission address conflicting judicial decisions through
its authority to make clarifying amendments, Braxton strongly affirms the
above-described statutory view of a vigorous, continuing guideline amend-
ment process in which the Commission, subject to the dictates of Congress,
is the active architect of sentencing policy. 51
A. Responding to Court Guideline Decisions-General Observations
About the Amendment Process and Its Limitations
In reality, because it essentially reinforces a statutory mission upon
which the Commission already was engaged, Braxton has not changed
dramatically either the manner in which the Commission monitors court
application of the guidelines or the nature of the guideline amendment task.
It has led, however, to greater emphasis in the Commission's information-
gathering, analysis, and amendment-promulgation process being placed on
areas of pronounced disparity in guideline application.
Over the course of its brief history, the Commission has developed an
approach to guideline review and revision that typically involves compre-
hensive reexamination of guidelines applicable to groups of related offenses
(for example, drug trafficking offenses) or offender characteristics (for
example, criminal history) by Commission staff working groups. Within the
information assembled by these groups is an analysis of district and appellate
court application and interpretation of the guidelines being examined, with
intercircuit conflicts in guideline interpretation receiving special attention.
Indeed, an early awareness of disparate court application of particular
51. That is not to say that the United States Supreme Court intends to play no role in
the adjudication of guideline-related issues. Indeed, the Court has continued to grant writs of
certiorari in a small number of guideline cases involving intercircuit conflicts on constitutional
or statutory issues. See, e.g., Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840 (1992) (involving court
review of prosecutorial refusal to file motion for substantial assistance downward departure
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1); Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112
(1992) (involving construction of 18 U.S.C. § 3742, guidelines' appellate review statutory
provisions); United States v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. 1329 (1992) (regarding applicability of guidelines
to juvenile sentencings); United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993) (involving consti-
tutionality of guidelines' obstruction of justice enhancement for defendant's perjurious trial
testimony); Stinson v. United States, 943 F.2d 1268 (lth Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 957 F.2d
813 (1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 459 (1992) (regarding ability of Commission to clarify its
intent through commentary amendments). Obviously, the Commission is not in a position to
resolve intercircuit conflicts involving issues of statutory or constitutional interpretation.
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guidelines often has been a factor in Commission designation of guidelines
for working group study.
5 2
As the Commission goes about its amendment task, it encounters the
inherent limitations incumbent upon any institutional body making it im-
possible in practice to formulate a perfect, or perfectly clear, set of rules.
These limitations, together with realities of a federal criminal justice system
that involves handling thousands of criminal cases by hundreds of judges,
generate two "inevitables" with respect to the Commission's guideline
amendment process. First, it is inevitable that the Commission's process
will be largely reactive to court decisions and that it will constantly function
in a "catch-up" mode. An amendment process, if it is to be thorough in
its assessment of relevant information and ultimately effective in its objec-
tive, takes time. The statutory procedure requires public participation by
interested groups, that in turn need time to study amendment proposals and
comment on them in writing or orally at a Commission public hearing, and
it requires 180 days for congressional review before guideline amendments
may take effect. Also, due to court interpretations of the applicability of
the Ex Post Facto Clause, amendments that punish more severely generally
are applicable only to offenses occurring after their effective date. For these
reasons, the Commission's amendment actions may not be perfectly syn-
chronized with guideline application in the courtroom at any given moment.
Second, it must be kept in mind that application of the guidelines in
the federal criminal justice system involves imposition of sentence annually
in some 45,000 cases,53 using a Guidelines Manual containing more than
200 guidelines,5 4 with appeals of sentence (or conviction and sentence)
annually in some 7,600 cases.5 5 In this context, it is inevitable, no matter
52. Typically, the Commission identifies broad topical guideline areas for priority study
and possible amendment action in late spring or early summer, following submission of a
previous set of amendments to Congress. Public comment then is sought on the Commission's
tentatively-identified priorities. See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 32,246 (1992). Working groups are
formed to examine the topical areas for study and the Commission determines whether the
groups are to complete their work on a "one-" or "two-year" cycle. Those on the shorter
time line actually have fewer than six months to complete reports and recommend amendment
proposals because the Commission typically decides in December which amendments should
be published in the Federal Register for comment. See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 62,832 (1992)
(containing amendment proposals under consideration in current 1992-1993 cycle).
53. When fully phased in, it is estimated that the guidelines will apply to approximately
45,000 class A misdemeanor and felony cases each year. This volume may increase or,
conceivably, decrease.
54. The 1992 Guidelines Manual contains nine directional guidelines in Chapter One,
179 offense conduct guidelines in Chapter Two, 15 general adjustment guidelines in Chapter
Three, six criminal history-related guidelines in Chapter Four, and 12 sentence determination
guidelines in Chapter Five. Additionally, there are a number of policy statements scattered
throughout the Manual that instruct courts on application of the guidelines and other sentencing
matters. There also is a separate Chapter Eight containing guidelines and policy statements
for the sentencing of organizations. Of course, the number of guidelines actually applied in
the sentencing of an individual case is but a fraction of the total number in the Manual.
55. ADNISTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs, ANNUAL REPORT OF TnE DIRECTOR,
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how carefully the Commission chooses the words that appear in the Guide-
lines Manual, that courts will differ sometimes in their reading of guideline
provisions and in their application of those provisions to the facts of varying
cases. Consequently, "pockets" of disparity in guideline sentencing law will
appear. Thus, the task of amending the guidelines to reduce unwarranted
disparity is a continuing one.
56
Turning to the manner in which guideline amendments address disparity
concerns, it can be said that, broadly speaking, amendments that have a
disparity reduction purpose fall into one of two categories: (1) amendments
that relate to determination of the applicable guideline range and (2)
amendments that relate to sentencing outside the guideline range. Both types
have figured prominently in Commission amendment actions. While the
latter departure-related category tends to garner more attention, amendments
in the former category have been far more numerous.1
7
B. Use of Amendments to Promote More Consistent Guideline
Application
In applying the federal sentencing guidelines, courts sometimes have
differed both in their interpretations of guideline language and in their
application of the guidelines to varying, often complex, sets of facts. While
both can lead to sentencing disparity under a guideline system, it is the
former disparate construction of guideline language that must be of primary
concern to the Commission for several reasons. Fundamentally, as a matter
of institutional and statutory responsibility, the Commission, as the origi-
nator of guideline language, has an obligation to address instances in which
the words it writes to guide court discretion lead to pronounced differences
in court interpretation of the intended meaning of those words. Additionally,
when appellate courts construe specific passages of the guideline system,
Table B-i (1992); STATISTICS DIViSION, ADMiN. OFFIcE oF T U.S. COURTS, SuMMARY STATIS-
Tics (1992) (unpublished, on file with the United States Sentencing Commission, Washington,
D.C.). According to these unpublished statistics, during the 12 months ending September 30,
1992, appeals were filed in 9,597 guideline cases. Of these appeals, 1,566 involved an appeal
of the conviction only. The balance were appeals of conviction and sentence (5,098 cases),
sentence only (2,534 cases), or type unknown (399 cases).
56. A number of other factors contribute to the need for amendments. Among these are
the creation of new criminal offenses, changes in statutory penalties, or enactment of directives
to the Commission from Congress. The Commission also periodically reassesses and may
amend guidelines to reflect more appropriately the seriousness of conduct, as determined by
the Commission. Illustrative of the latter are amendments that adjusted the offense levels for
robbery offenses (U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 110, 365) and fraud offenses (id. at amend. 154).
57. Precise categorization of amendments is not possible because many have multiple
parts and further more than one objective. In general, about one-half of the Commission's
473 amendments to date have been motivated by an intent to clarify guideline language, often
in response to court decisions, and ease application problems. Another approximately 15% of
the amendments have been precipitated directly by legislation; approximately 10% relate to
departure issues; about 5% were Commission initiatives to adjust offense levels; and the
balance involved a variety of technical or conforming changes.
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they create rules of sentencing law that can profoundly affect both the
punishment defendants receive in like cases as well as the' larger policy
objectives of the SRA.
Consider, for example, the issue of whether the offense of being a felon
in possession of a firearm5 s constitutes a "crime of violence" for the purpose
of applying the guidelines' enhanced penalty provisions for a "career
offender" 59 Appellate courts have divided over this issue, both with respect
to considering the defendant's underlying violent conduct in determining
whether the offense is a crime of violence,6° and with respect to whether a
felon-in-possession offense is inherently a crime of violence under the
definition of that term employed by the Commission in section 4B1.2.61 For
defendants convicted of 18 U.S.C. section 922(g) offenses, the difference in
the length of imprisonment imposed could be substantial, depending solely
on the circuit court's precedentsA2 This substantially different sentencing
treatment, stemming from disparate court interpretation of guideline ter-
minology, creates problems of sentencing fairness for individual defendants.
Moreover, in the aggregate, it seriously impairs the achievement of SRA
objectives. Consequently, the Commission has responded to the disparate
court interpretation of felon-in-possession offenses vis-A-vis the career of-
fender guidelines by amending section 4B1.2 and its accompanying com-
mentary. 63 The amendments, which the appellate courts generally have
58. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988).
59. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.I, 4BI.2 (implementing statutory directive at 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)
to assure that certain defendants convicted of third violent or drug trafficking offense are
sentenced to imprisonment "at or near the maximum term authorized").
60. Compare United States v. Cornelius, 931 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that courts
may consider underlying conduct in determining whether offense is crime of violence); United
States v. Walker, 930 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d
915 (7th Cir. 1990) (same), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2057 (1991); and United States v. Williams,
892 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 939 (1990) with United States v.
Bell, 966 F.2d 703 (ist Cir. 1992) (courts may only consider conduct charged in indictment)
and United States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1992) (same).
61. Compare United States v. Stinson, 943 F.2d 1268 (11th Cir. 1991) (felon-in-possession
is inherently crime of violence), cert. granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 459 (1992) and United States
v. O'Neal, 910 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), amd. reh'g en banc denied, 937 F.2d 1369
(1991), overruled by United States v. Sahakian, 965 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1992) with Bell, 966
F.2d at 703 (felon-in-possession is not inherently crime of violence) and Johnson, 953 F.2d at
115 (same).
62. For example, a defendant who pleads guilty to being a felon-in-possession and who
also is subject to the enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) as an "armed career criminal"
would typically face a guideline range of 151-188 months under U.S.S.G. § 4BI.4 (offense
level 33, reduced by 2 levels for acceptance of responsibility, criminal history category IV). If,
however, the felon-in-possession offense is considered a crime of violence, the same defendant
might be subject to an additional sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.1 as a career
offender and face a guideline range of 292-365 months (offense level 37, reduced by 2 levels
for acceptance of responsibility, criminal history category VI). In this example, the determi-
nation of whether the section 922(g) offense is a crime of violence under the career offender
guideline could translate into a sentencing difference on the order of 12 years or more.
63. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 433, 461.
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recognized and applied," are designed to make clear Commission intent
that the 18 U.S.C. section 922(g) offense is not to be considered a crime
of violence, although a defendant convicted of that offense will be subject
to an enhanced punishment under the firearms offense guideline65 and may
be subject to further enhancement under the guideline applicable to armed
career criminals.
66
In contrast to disparate court construction of guideline language, dif-
ferences in court application of guideline provisions with an agreed-upon
meaning are of less immediate concern to the Commission. The SRA was
neither intended nor could realistically hope to remove from the criminal
justice system all disparities of this nature. The SRA scheme of appellate
review is evidence of this greater tolerance of variations in sentencing court
factual determinations that form the basis for applying the guidelines, as
well as variations in judgment resulting from application of the guidelines
to the facts of a case. Specifically, the statute instructs courts of appeals
reviewing guideline sentences to "give due regard to the opportunity of the
district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, . . . [to] accept the
findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and
[to] give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines
to the facts." 67 Most appellate courts have interpreted the "due deference"
standard as functionally equivalent to a "clearly erroneous" level of scrutiny
of district court factual determinations, thereby engendering a greater tol-
erance of variations in guideline application by sentencing judges.
6
8
Analogizing to the greater deference generally exhibited by the appellate
courts in reviewing findings of fact made by district courts, the Commis-
sion's amendment authority can be exercised, consistent with the Sentencing
64. See United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 703 (lst Cir. (1992); United States v. Fitzhugh,
954 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Sahakian, 965 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1992),
overruling United States v. O'Neal, 910 F.2d 663 (1990), amd. reh'g en banc denied, 937 F.2d
1369 (1991). But see United States v. Stinson, 957 F.2d 813 (11th Cir. 1992).
65. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 provides an enhancement of at least two levels (approximately
25%) if the defendant is a "prohibited person," defined to include those convicted under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
66. U.S.S.G. § 4BI.4 provides for the offense level to be enhanced to a minimum of 33
and the criminal history category to be increased to a minimum of category IV for a defendant
convicted of being a felon-in-possession who is subject to the enhanced penalty under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) as an armed career criminal (generally defined as one who has three previous
convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1988).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Quan-Guerra, 929 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Medina-Saldana, 911 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Howard, 894 F.2d 1085
(9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Bums, 893 F.2d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2182 (1991); United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1989);
United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 868 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Barrett (Dolan),
890 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1989); cf. United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1991),
vacating 895 F.2d 641 (1990) (holding that due deference standard not new standard of review,
but requires court to determine degree of factual inquiry involved and apply corresponding
standard-clearly erroneous standard for purely factual inquiries, de novo for those closer to
legal questions); see also William W. Wilkins, Jr., Sentencing Reform and Appellate Review,
46 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 429, 434-35 (1989).
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Reform Act, in a more restrained fashion regarding differences in court
application of guideline language to similar cases. The monitoring of district
and appellate court application decisions over a period of time is the most
effective and efficient approach in this area, and it is this course of action
that the Commission generally has followed in its process of guideline review
and revision. Accordingly, working groups established by the Commission
to study specific topics are requested to present the Commission with both
qualitative information about differences in court interpretation of relevant
guidelines and also quantitative information indicating the extent to which
courts are applying guideline provisions in a given manner to commonly
occurring offense or offender characteristics. For example, a working group
active in the 1991-1992 amendment cycle assessed for the Commission the
frequency with which drug couriers were classified as minor or minimal
participants under U.S.S.G. section 3B1.2, which provides a reduction of
two, three, or four offense levels for mitigating role. Another working
group, charged with examining the operation of U.S.S.G. section 3El.I,
the guideline providing a reduction of two or three levels for a defendant's
acceptance of responsibility, assessed the frequency with which this reduction
was given to defendants who were convicted after trial, as opposed to those
who pleaded guilty.
Commission amendment actions to date have addressed both differences
in court interpretation of guideline provisions and, to a lesser extent,
differences in court application of guidelines about which there is no
interpretive dispute. While examples of these amendment types can be seen
in many provisions of the Guidelines Manual, amendments to U.S.S.G.
section 1B1.3, the Relevant Conduct guideline, and other guideline provi-
sions that operate in conjunction with it, appropriately illustrate how the
Commission has used its amendment authority to promote a greater con-
sistency in guideline application.
An understanding of section IBI.3 and its relevance in applying other
guideline provisions is central to the correct and consistent application of
the guidelines. 69 Generally speaking, this guideline determines the scope of
a defendant's offense conduct and that of others acting in concert with the
defendant that will be used to determine the defendant's base offense level
under applicable guideline(s) in Chapter Two of the Manual, any increases
or decreases in that offense level from specific offense characteristics in
Chapter Two guidelines, and any offense level adjustments from Chapter
Three.
7 0
Relatively early in the application history of this guideline, a difference
arose among the courts of appeals over its construction with respect to
whether inclusion of conduct outside the offense(s) of conviction was
intended. Specifically, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
69. See generally William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The
Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REv. 495 (1990).
70. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a).
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the Ninth Circuit saw language inconsistencies between section IBI.3 and
the guidelines in Chapter Three, Part D, pertaining to the determination of
a combined offense level in cases involving multiple counts of conviction.
71
The court resolved this "ambiguity" in the defendant's favor by not
including conduct in counts of which the defendant was not convicted.72
Although this ruling was later withdrawn and replaced with a decision that
interpreted the guideline in a manner consistent with Commission intent
and the decisions of other circuits,73 the Commission reinforced its view in
the interim by adopting clarifying amendments to the commentary of section
1B1.3 and section 3D1.2.74
More significantly, the Commission added language and illustrations to
the relevant conduct guideline and its commentary in 198975 and 1992.76 The
principal objective of each effort was to clarify the scope of conduct covered
by this key guideline. These amendments each followed a comprehensive
examination of district and appellate court applications of the guideline and
were motivated by Commission conclusions that amendments were needed
to make its application more uniform.77
The Commission also has amended other guidelines to clarify that
determinations under those guidelines are based on the scope of conduct
found "relevant" under section iB1.3. For example, after a series of
appellate decisions that based role in the offense determinations under
section 3Bl.1 and section 3B1.2 solely upon conduct in the count of
conviction, 78 the Commission revised the commentary introducing Chapter
Three, Part B, to reinforce its intent that "[tihe determination of a defen-
dant's role in the offense is to be made on the basis of all conduct within
the scope of section lBl.3 (Relevant Conduct), i.e., all conduct within the
scope of section 1B1.3(a)(1)-(4), and not solely on the basis of elements and
acts cited in the count of conviction."
79
71. United States v. Restrepo, 883 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989).
72. Id. at 786.
73. United Statse v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1991).
74. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 309.
75. Id. at amends. 76-78.
76. Id. at amend. 439.
77. For a discussion of application inconsistencies found by researchers outside the
Commission, see Pamela B. Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An Empirical Study of the Application
of Relevant Conduct Guideline § IBI.3, 4 Fed. Sent. R. 330 (1992).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Barbontin, 907 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1990) (limiting "role
in the offense" determination to offense of conviction); United States v. Rodriguez-Nuez, 919
F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(same); United States v. Lanese, 890 F.2d 1284 (2d Cir. 1989) (same). But see United States
v. Fells, 920 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1990) (allowing evidence of activity outside offense of
conviction in "role in the offense" determination).
79. U.S.S.G. ch. 3, pt. B, intro. cmt., as amended by app. C, amend. 345, 456. The
amended commentary emphasizes the application principle in § 1B1.3(a) stating that unless
otherwise specified, adjustments in Chapter Three, of which role in the offense is one, are
based upon the scope of conduct included within § 1BI.3.
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C. Use of Amendments to Redress Disparity in Relation to Sentences
Outside the Guideline Range (Departures)
Just as courts sometimes differ in interpreting guideline provisions used
to determine the guideline range applicable in similar cases, they also may
differ in their reading of provisions for sentencing outside the applicable
range. Unwarranted sentence disparities arising from differences in departure
jurisprudence, particularly among courts at the appellate level, also may
warrant Commission amendment response. However, a number of consid-
erations with respect to court departure decisions, on the whole, tend to
lessen the need for Commission amendment action in this area.
The SRA authorizes a court to impose a sentence outside the applicable
guideline range if it "finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consid-
eration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described." 0 The statute
further provides that a court, by looking only to the guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary within the Guidelines Manual,"' shall
determine whether a particular factor is adequately taken into account. This
provision facilitates court departure determinations by focusing the inquiry
on the relevant words of the guidelines under consideration, and on rea-
sonable inferences that can be drawn from that language, rather than on
the scope or adequacy of the Commission's internal deliberative processes. 
2
In applying this statutory departure authorization and the parallel
provisions of 18 U.S.C. section 3742 that relate to appellate review of
departure sentences, all of the courts of appeals with criminal jurisdiction
have articulated certain criteria that sentences outside the guideline range
must satisfy. For the most part, departure tests employed by the circuit
courts are similar.83 Most courts of appeals require a departure to be:
(1) based on an appropriate factor "not adequately taken into considera-
tion," (2) supported in the record by sufficient evidentiary findings, and
(3) reasonable in its extent.84
The United States Supreme Court also construed the appellate review
statute in Williams v. United States,s a decision that has relevance to the
Commission's authority to affect future court departure decisions via amend-
ments to the guidelines, policy statements, and commentary. Although
addressing a number of issues, the Williams decision emphasizes the im-
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
81. Id.
82. See 133 CONG. REc. S16647-48 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statements of Sens. Kennedy
and Thurmond); see also United States v. Leroy, No. 92-5086 (10th Cir. Jan. 26, 1993)
(denying defendant's request for discovery of information underlying Commission promulgation
of drug offense guideline, § 2D.l).
83. Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure
Jurisprudence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 No=E DAmE L. Rav. 1 (1991).
84. Id. at 19-22.
85. 112 S. Ct. 1112 (1992).
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portance of Commission policy statements that inform courts about the
kind and degree of circumstances considered by the Commission in for-
mulating applicable guidelines. Specifically, the Court stated that such policy
statements constitute "an authoritative guide to the meaning of the appli-
cable guideline," and "an error in interpreting such a policy statement
could lead to an incorrect determination that a departure was appropriate.""6
Williams complements the Court's earlier Braxton message by recogniz-
ing the central role of the Commission in regulating court departure deci-
sions. In other words, it logically follows from Braxton and Williams that
the Court expects the Commission to use its amendment authority appro-
priately to address inter-circuit conflicts in departure law to the extent such
conflicts stem from differences in interpretation of Guidelines Manual
language.87
The Commission to date has issued a modest number of amendments
responding to court departure decisions. Among the approaches employed
by the Commission after considering departure cases are: (1) incorporating
departure factors into relevant guidelines, (2) expressly inviting future de-
partures in certain circumstances, while on occasion also providing guidance
as to the appropriate extent of such departures, (3) precluding departures
based on particular factors except when such factors occur to an extraor-
dinary degree, and (4) precluding departures based on stated factors abso-
lutely. To this list of affirmative amendment actions, which will be further
discussed below, should be added another alternative course: that of further
studying an issue but taking no amendment action. In fact, although some
have criticized the Commission for acting too hastily to constrain departure.
decisions, 8 in reality the Commission to date has taken no action-other
than to continue gathering and analyzing data-with regard to most district
court departure sentences and appellate decisions affirming departures. 9
1. Incorporation of Departure Factors into Relevant Guidelines
As generally discussed above, Congress intended that the Commission
use information gleaned from district court statements of reasons and
86. Id. at 1119.
87. Williams presented a situation involving both a circuit conflict in interpretation of
the sentence appellate review statute (regarding when remand is necessary in a case in which
a departure was based on both proper and improper factors) and a conflict in the interpretation
of provisions in the Manual (regarding whether a departure properly could be based on dated
prior convictions not similar to the instant offense). The Court addressed the statutory issue
but not the guideline dispute. Subsequently, the Commission clarified the latter by issuing
amendment 472, effective November 1, 1992. This amendment states that dissimilar, serious
prior offenses that occurred too long ago to be counted in the guidelines' criminal history
score may be considered in determining whether an upward departure is warranted under
U.S.S.G. § 4AI.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History Category).
88. See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unaccept-
able Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992).
89. Currently, a Commission working group is engaged in a comprehensive two-year
analysis of departures that could result in recommendations to the Commission, including
possible amendments, in the latter part of 1993.
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appellate court departure decisions to improve the "fit" between the guide-
lines and actual cases. 90 Amending the guidelines to address departure
circumstances more comprehensively within the applicable guideline range
in turn facilitates achievement of the SRA goal of reasonable sentence
uniformity. In a number of instances, the Commission has issued amend-
ments that further the disparity reduction objective by expressly incorpo-
rating a departure circumstance into the guideline. For example, an upward
departure affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Hummer9'
contributed to the Commission's amendment of the extortion offense guide-
line.92 The amendment added specific offense characteristics suggested by
aggravating factors present in that and other similar cases. 93 Amendment
320, 94 which tied the offense level of the guideline for "telephone count"
drug offenses" to the quantity of controlled substance involved, provides
another illustration of departure incorporation via an amendment that makes
the guideline more comprehensive of possible mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. This amendment was motivated largely by upward departures
in a significant number of "telephone count" cases that involved large
quantities of drugs, including several such cases that were considered on
appeal.9
6
2. Invitations for Future Departures
The continuing Commission review of district and appellate cases also
has contributed to a number of amendments that describe circumstances
the Commission believes could warrant a sentence outside the guideline
range. For example, in 1991, the Commission issued a new policy statement,
section 5K2.15 (Terrorism),97 partly in response to the type of criminal
activity highlighted in United States v. Kikumura.95 This policy statement
invites a sentencing court to impose an above-guideline sentence if the
defendant committed the offense in furtherance of a terroristic action.
The Commission also has used its amendment authority to express its
view about the extent of departure appropriate for a specific circumstance.
For example, in response to differences in appellate rulings regarding upward
90. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 5, at 79-80, 15-51, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3262-63, 3333-34.
91. 916 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1990).
92. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2 (Extortion by Force or Threat of Injury or Serious Damage).
93. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 366.
94. Id. amend. 320.
95. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.6 (Use of Communication Facility in Committing Drug Offense).
This provision is applicable to offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Feekes, 929 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Anders, 899 F.2d 570 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 532 (1990); United States v. Williams,
895 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Bennett, 900 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1990).
97. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 292.
98. 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990). The case involved an upward departure of 330 months
based on evidence that the appellant had manufactured three lethal homemade fire bombs in
preparation for a major terrorist attack in the United States.
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departures above the most serious criminal history category applicable to
defendants, 99 the Commission amended the section 4A1.3 commentary to
outline an incremental approach tied to the sentencing table? °
Departure guidance is sometimes provided by Commission amendments
that have other objectives as well. In fact, as the Commission reviews the
application of offense conduct guidelines through its working group process
of analysis, amendment revisions frequently reflect multiple purposes. For
example, in a comprehensive amendment revision, the Commission may
clarify guideline language to promote more uniform application, add pro-
visions that more fully describe the "heartland" of conduct covered by the
guideline,' 0' and describe circumstances outside the heartland of the revised
guideline that could warrant departure. The Commission's 1991 revisions
of the extortion guideline' °2 and the firearms offense guideline03 illustrate
this comprehensive revision approach. In both instances, the rewriting
clarified terminology, adjusted punishment levels by taking into account
additional offense characteristics, and added commentary inviting upward
departures in certain circumstances.'04
3. Limiting Departures to Extraordinary Cases
On a very few occasions, the Commission has issued new or amended
policy statements that seek to limit, but not absolutely preclude, departures.
These amendments have addressed departure use of the following offender
characteristics: (1) youth, 0 5 (2) physical condition or appearance, including
physique,"' 6 and (3) military, civic, charitable, or public service; employment-
99. Compare United States v. Schmude, 901 F.2d 555, 559-60 (7th Cir. 1990) (prescribing
procedure for extrapolating by analogy to Sentencing Table to reach sentence that more
appropriately reflects seriousness of defendant's prior record) and United States v. Ferra, 900
F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 1990) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1939 (1992) with United States
v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1990) (approving Schmude approach as appropriate
in some cases while not strictly mandating it) and United States v. Molina, 952 F.2d 514, 521-
22 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (same), and with United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 336 (1st Cir.
1990) (rejecting bright-line, extrapolation-by-analogy rule because "reasonableness is a concept,
not a constant").
100. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 460.
101. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A4(b) (explaining Commission's general intent that courts
"treat each guideline as carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct
that each guideline describes").
102. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 366.
103. Id. at amend. 374.
104. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2, cmt. nn. 7, 8; id. § 2K2.1, cmt. nn. 10, 11.
105. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 386. A number of appellate decisions, construing policy
statement § 5HI.6, had disapproved of basing a downward departure on a defendant's young
age. See, e.g., United States v. Shoupe, 929 F.2d 116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 382
(1991); United States v. White, 945 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Summers, 893
F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1990).
106. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 386. This portion of the amendment can be said to express
the Commission's view that a below-guideline sentence would not ordinarily be appropriate
based on circumstances similar to those at issue in United States v. Lara-Morales, 905 F.2d
599 (2d Cir. 1990) (in which that court approved a downward departure for male defendant
of effeminate appearance who allegedly had suffered abuse in jail prior to sentencing).
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related contributions; record of prior good works."°7 In each of these cases,
the Commission responded to court decisions by issuing an amendment
expressing its view that these characteristics should be considered "not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the
guideline range."108
4. Absolute Preclusion of Departures
To date, in only one instance has the Commission issued an amendment
designed absolutely to preclude downward departures for a specific offender
characteristic. That involved the issuance of policy statement section 5H1.12,
in November 1992,109 which states the Commission's view that "lack of
guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged
upbringing are not relevant grounds" for a departure. A decision by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Floyd"0 directly precipitated this Com-
mission action. The amendment places these factors in the company of only
a few others-substance abuse, personal financial hardship, and the consti-
tutionally- or statutorily-prohibited factors of race, sex, national origin,
creed, religion, and socioeconomic status"'-that are absolutely precluded
from departure consideration.
The strength of Commission disapproval of "lack of youthful guidance"
as a basis for departure can be attributed to a number of factors. Among
them was a concern that this particular label, amorphous as it is, potentially
could be applied to an extremely large number of cases prosecuted in federal
court, thereby permitting judges wide discretion to impose virtually any
sentence they deemed appropriate (within or below the guidelines). The
unwarranted disparity that could result from such a wide-open path around
the guidelines was inconsistent with SRA objectives as the Commission
understood them. Moreover, departures predicated on this factor could
reintroduce into the sentencing equation considerations of a defendant's
107. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 386. District court decisions involving departures for a
defendant's good works and piositive contributions played a prominent role in the issuance of
this policy statement. Appellate courts have consistently remanded district court decisions that
permit departure for these reasons. See, e.g., United States v. McHan, 920 F.2d 244 (4th Cir.
1990) (sentencing court could not consider defendant's contributions to town through his real
estate development company and his bank to depart downward from guideline); United States
v. Neil, 903 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1990) (stability of defendant's family life, commendable military
service, and his involvement in coaching young athletes did not justify downward departure
from guidelines). However, the continued litigation involving these issues influenced the
Commission to issue this new policy statement. The subsequent apparent decrease in appellate
cases involving a departure for these reasons suggests that the policy statement effectively
communicated Commission intent that departures based on offender "good citizen" charac-
teristics rarely would be appropriate.
108. See U.S.S.G. §§ 5HI.1, 5HI.4, 5HI.I1.
109. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 466.
110. 956 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1991).
111. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A4(b).
SENTENCING GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS
socioeconomic background and other personal characteristics that Congress
clearly intended the guidelines to place off limits.
112
5. Grounds for Amendment Restraint with Respect to Court Departure
Decisions
Although the Commission on several occasions has used its amendment
authority to address departure circumstances discussed in court decisions,
its overall posture in this respect has been one of restraint."13 Viewed in the
context of SRA goals, at least two good reasons exist for a deliberate course
of Commission amendment action in this area. One is that the SRA
obviously contemplates some reasonable degree of sentencing outside guide-
line boundaries."14 The other key structural consideration is that, under the
SRA, departures are authorized but never mandated.
The appellate courts uniformly have held that as long as the sentencing
judge properly understands the authority to depart, the informed exercise
of discretion to impose a sentence within the applicable guideline range is
not reviewable. 1 5 The fact that judges are not compelled to depart for
circumstances that a particular court of appeals may have endorsed as
departure-appropriate, and therefore may well decide to sentence within the
guideline range, generally means that the Commission has less need for
immediate concern about unwarranted disparity resulting from appellate
departure decisions at variance with Commission intent. As previously
indicated, the Commission has not elected to forbear in all such cases.
Nevertheless, in general it can be said that appellate departure decisions,
even if inconsistent, on the whole produce less need for amendment action
than do inter-circuit conflicts over the interpretation of guideline language
that removes discretion from the sentencing court to elect a different course.
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988) (mandating Commission to assure absolute neutrality
under guidelines with respect to race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of
offenders).
113. Through fiscal year 1991, courts sentenced below the guideline range for reasons
other than a defendant's substantial assistance to law enforcement authorities in almost 5,000
cases. In comparison, the total number of amendments that relate to departures in some
fashion is less than 50, and few of these were specifically designed to constrain downward
departures. While these rough comparative numbers cannot be said to show definitively the
number of actual departure cases that might have been affected by the amendments, they do
not support the view that the Commission has been "quick on the draw" with amendments
to constrain downward departures.
114. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 5, at 51-52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3234-
35.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Ortez, 902 F.2d 61 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v.
Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330 (Ist Cir. 1990); United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, Ill S. Ct. 65 (1990); United States v. Evidente, 894 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 922 (1990); United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Davis, 900 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 155 (1990); United States v. Colon,
884 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 998 (1989).
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IV. BALANCING COMPETING CONCERNS
While this article attempts to describe SRA policy objectives that
together prompt Commission amendment action when the issue of unwar-
ranted sentencing disparity arises, a number of competing considerations
warrant acknowledgement. Concerns voiced from time to time in opposition
to the promulgation of additional amendments ' 6 include: (1) difficulties in
staying apprised of guideline changes, (2) concerns about whether amend-
ment language achieves the desired objective clearly and effectively,
(3) problems in applying amendments in concert with a constantly changing
body of case law, (4) difficulties in applying amendments consistent with
ex post facto interpretations by the appellate courts, (5) disagreements with
the substance of proposed amendments, and (6) general policy differences
regarding the appropriate role of the Commission vis-a-vis the SRA charter,
Congress, the courts, and others involved in the criminal justice system.
Full discussion of these issues is not possible here, but a few points are
worthy of note. Staying current with changing law has always been a
challenge for those involved in the criminal justice system. That task can
be especially difficult for busy probation officers who have been thrust by
the SRA into the forefront of guideline specialization. The Commission's
strong commitment to continuing guideline education, carried out with the
assistance of a full-time training and technical assistance staff, helps ame-
liorate this concern. Other agencies, including the Department of Justice,
Federal Judicial Center, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and
private bar groups cooperate in this endeavor.
The Commission deserves to be faulted when its amendment efforts are
less than clear and fail effectively to address problem areas in guideline
application. While its "track record" in this regard may not be unblemished,
complications in some amendments can be attributed to factors beyond the
Commission's control, such as difficulties in reconciling mandatory mini-
mum statutes with the guidelines.117 On the whole, the Commission's clar-
ifying amendments seem to have been well received by courts, probation
officers, and others called upon to apply amended guideline language."18
116. See, e.g., Judge Frederic N. Smalkin, Remarks at the United States Sentencing
Commission's Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments (Feb. 25, 1992) (on file with Com-
mission); Paul D. Borman, Remarks on behalf of the American Bar Association, Criminal
Justice Section, at the United States Sentencing Commission's Hearing on Proposed Amend-
ments (Mar. 5, 1991) (on file with Commission).
117. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. app. C., amend. 405 (amending application note 2 of commentary
to § 2K2.4 entitled "Use of Firearms or Armor-Piercing Ammunition During or in Relation
to Certain Crimes"). The rule expressed in the commentary has been criticized for its
complexity. While the described procedure may be complicated, it is the practical impossibility
of accommodating a fixed, flat statutory sentence, as required under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), in a
proportional guidelines system that is the root of the problem.
118. The Commission is in the process of developing an empirical data base of appellate
decisions that will help it more effectively assess the effect of amendments on the volume of
appeals relating to issues addressed by particular amendments. An examination of case law on
particular issues, preamendment and postamendment, to a limited extent also can demonstrate
the effectiveness of particular amendments.
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Moreover, although applying the guidelines consistently with constantly
evolving case law admittedly can be difficult, Commission clarifying amend-
ments can ameliorate this difficulty by restoring greater uniformity of
guideline law.
Problems inherent in applying amended guidelines consistent with ex
post facto constraints are a matter of considerable concern to the Commis-
sion." 9 Congress anticipated this legal issue and stated its strong policy view
that courts should apply the guidelines and policy statements in effect at
the time of sentencing.2' Were that uniformly the case, application of
amended guidelines would be substantially less problematic. However, be-
cause of the near-unanimous view of the appellate courts that the Ex Post
Facto Clause precludes application of postoffense amendments that increase
punishment,' 2' relief may be possible only if the United States Supreme
Court has occasion to consider the issue of whether, given the unique
features of the federal guidelines system,'2 amendments that alter a defen-
dant's guideline exposure within unchanged statutory parameters can be
fully applied as Congress intended under the SRA. '1
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
No purpose was more important to Congress and the several Admin-
istrations that worked for years to enact the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 than the avoidance of unwarranted disparity and resulting unfairness
in the sentencing of similarly situated defendants. This noble goal, about
which there is virtually unanimous agreement in principle, was one that
Congress recognized would be constantly in tension with a changing body
of sentencing law. The SRA therefore provided that the Sentencing Com-
mission would function as a permanent, auxiliary agency in the Judicial
Branch, and it mandated the Commission to amend the sentencing guidelines
as necessary to promote the goal of reasonable sentencing uniformity. The
119. See U.S.S.G. § IBI.1 (providing guidance on application of amended guidelines
when constrained by ex post facto clause); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 62, 832-33 (1992) (discussing
proposed expansion of this policy statement to address multiple count cases).
120. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4), (5) (1988).
121. See supra note 23.
122. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987).
123. It also has been suggested that Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) and
(5) to direct courts to use guidelines and policy statements in effect at the time a defendant's
offense was committed. While such a change might lessen somewhat the difficulties of applying
amended guidelines vis-h-vis the Ex Post Facto Clause, it would 'not eliminate them. Courts
would still need to address the issue of how amendments are to be applied in cases in which
a defendant is convicted of multiple counts (in which amendments take effect between offenses).
Courts also would still have to determine whether amendments taking effect after the date of
an offense were clarifying changes that should be given effect. Moreover, from a policy
standpoint, such a change would involve an about-face from the strongly stated congressional
goal of structuring court discretion through the use of the most current, 'sophisticated
statements [of sentencing policy] available." See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 5, at 77-78,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3260-61.
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United States Supreme Court has strongly reaffirmed the appropriateness
of that Commission role in the Mistretta and, more specifically, Braxton
decisions. In turn, the Commission has sought to conduct its amendment
responsibilities with the goal of reducing unwarranted disparity always in
mind, but with sensitivity to competing concerns.
Developing sentencing policy is a highly controversial enterprise, and
those active in this arena will no doubt continue vigorously to debate the
Commission's proper role and level of activity in exercising its amendment
authority. The Commission can and should carefully consider these concerns,
but in the final analysis, it must take its cue from the statute and endeavor
faithfully to execute the continuing mission Congress has prescribed.
